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Protection Goals
• Protection goals — confidentiality
– Protection of the identity of a user while using a service
• Anonymity in counseling services
– Protection of the communication relations of users
• Users may know identity of each other
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anonymity group «event»
message
access
Everybody can be the originator of an «event» with an equal likelihood
Anonymity and unobservability
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Observation of
communication
relations may give
information about
contents
Why encryption is not enough
Attorney Miller,
specialized in
mergers
company 1
company 2
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Protection Goals
• Outsiders
– … tapping the «line»
– … doing traffic analysis
• Insiders
– Network operator (or corrupt staff) reading e.g. billing data
– Governmental organizations asking for log files
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Building blocks of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
• Encryption
• Hiding communication relations
– Against weak outsiders
• Proxies
– Against insiders
• Broadcast
• Blind message service
• DC network
• MIX network
• Hiding transactions
– Pseudonyms
– Credentials (link properties to pseudonyms)
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Protection ideas (selection)
• Against weak outsider attacks
– Encryption — does not protect from traffic analysis
– Use a mediator:
• PROXY
• Users need to trust the proxy
• proxy knows all communication relations
Browser
FROM  myPC
GET Server.com/page.html
FROM  Proxy
GET Server.com/page.html
ServerProxy
adversary
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Protection ideas (selection)
• Against insider attacks
– Goal:
• Users need not trust the operator of anonymizing service
– Idea:
• Use more than one «mediator» from different operators
• At least one operator must be trustworthy
– Examples:
• Broadcast
• Blind message service
• DC network
• MIX network
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S1
S2
S3
D[1]:  1101101
D[2]:  1100110
D[3]:  0101110
D[4]:  1010101
D[1]:  1101101
D[2]:  1100110
D[3]:  0101110
D[4]:  1010101
D[1]:  1101101
D[2]:  1100110
D[3]:  0101110
D[4]:  1010101
Client queries for D[2]:
Index = 1234
Set vektor = 0100
Choose randomly request(S1) = 1011
Choose randomly request(S2) = 0110
Calculate request(S3) = 1001
cS1(1011)
cS2(0110)
cS3(1001)
Blind-Message-Service (Cooper, Birman, 1995): Query
• Protection goal:
– Databases gain no
information which entry
the client is interested in
• Replicated databases of
different operators
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Blind-Message-Service (Cooper, Birman, 1995): Answer
S1
S2
S3
D[1]:  1101101
D[2]:
D[3]:  0101110
D[4]:  1010101
Summe  0010110
D[1]:
D[2]:  1100110
D[3]:  0101110
D[4]:
Summe  1001000
D[1]:  1101101
D[2]:
D[3]:
D[4]:  1010101
Summe  0111000
Client queries for D[2]:
Index = 1234
Set vektor = 0100
Choose randomly request(S1) = 1011
Choose randomly request(S2) = 0110
Calculate (xor) request(S3) = 1001
S1: 0010110
S2: 1001000
S3: 0111000
Xor equals D[2]: 1100110
Answers from
Link encryption between client and databases
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DC network (Chaum, 1988)
• Everybody
1. Flip a coin with each other
2. Calculate xor of the two bits
3. If paid xor a 1 (negate the
result of step 2)
4. Tell your result
• Together
1. Calculate xor of the three
(local) results
2. If global result is Zero an
external person has paid
1 1
0
0 1
11
1
0
0
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MIX 1 MIX 2
Mixes (Chaum, 1981)
• Basic idea:
– Sample messages in a batch, change their coding and forward
them all at the same point of time but in a different order. All
messages have the same length.
– Use more than one Mix, operated by different operators.
– At least one Mix should not be corrupt.
• Then:
– Perfect unlinkability of sender and recipient.
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Timeline of development
Year   Idea / PET system
1978  Public-key encryption
1981  MIX, Pseudonyms
1983  Blind signature schemes
1985  Credentials
1988  DC network
1990  Privacy preserving value exchange
1991  ISDN-Mixes
1995  Blind message service
1995  Mixmaster
1996  MIXes in mobile communications
1996  Onion Routing
1997  Crowds Anonymizer
1998  Stop-and-Go (SG) Mixes introduced
1999  Zeroknowledge Freedom Anonymizer (service meanwhile closed)
2000  AN.ON/JAP Anonymizer
2004  TOR
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Internet/Web
• Technical background
– MIX based unobservable transport system
– Should withstand strong (big brother) attacks
• Information service (impossible to operate a perfect Anon system)
– Current level of protection (Anonymity level)
– Trade-off between performance and protection should be
decided by the user
• Open source project
– Client software: Java (platform independent)
– Server software: C/C++ (Win/NT, Linux/Unix)
• Technical and jurisdictional knowledge to serve legal issues
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Internet/Web
• JAP acts as
a local
proxy on
the local
machine
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• For free at
www.anon-
online.de
• First test version
has been
launched in
October 2000
• Full service has
been running
since February
2001
Internet/Web
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Mix based solution
for anonymous
Internet access
OpenSource
>10.000 users
>6 TByte per
month
www.anon-
online.de
AN.ON/JAP
Sponsor: BMWA, Partners: TU Dresden, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum
für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, FU Berlin, HU Berlin, Universität
Regensburg, Medizinische Universität Lübeck, Chaos Computer Club,
Ulmer Akademie für Datenschutz und IT-Sicherheit, RWTH Aachen,
New York University
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Public survey (Spiekermann 2003)
• Sample size:
– 1800 users of the JAP anonymizer
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Häufigkeitsgruppen (1=sproradic, 2=normal, 3=heavy)
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Public survey
• Willingness to pay for anonymity
– ! 40% absolutely not
– ! 50% monthly service fee of about " 2,5 … " 5
– ! 10% more than " 5 per month
• Willingness is independent of the
heaviness of usage
• Heaviness of usage
– ! 73% heavy users (use the
system at least daily)
– ! 10% use it at least twice
the week
– ! 17% sporadic (less than twice
the week)
sporadic heavynormal
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Public survey
• Reasons for using an anonymizing service
– ! 31% Free speech
– ! 54% protect from secret services
– ! 85% protect from profiling
– ! 64% protect against observation by my ISP
• Do you use it for private or business?
– ! 2% private only
– ! 59% mainly for private things
– ! 30% mainly for business things
– ! 9% business only
• Why do you use the JAP system?
– ! 76% free of charge
– ! 56% secure against the operator
– ! 51% easy to use
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Anonymized content
• 150 requests randomly picked from
millions of requests of June 2005
33 % erotic, pornography
 8 % private homepages, cinema, amusement
 3 % games
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Regions of users
• Incoming IP addresses have been classified into regions from May-
June 2005
60 %
Europe
27 %
Asia
12 %
America
1 % Rest of the world
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Regions of users
• Dayline of May 27, 2005
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Regions of users
• Dayline of Aug 1, 2005
Germany
Saudi Arabia
United States
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Censor-free Internet access
JAP
Blocking by government
WWW
ServerBlocked
MIX MIX MIX
JAP
JAP
...
JAP
JAPs act as a forwarder node for
the Anonymizer
Also blocked
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• JAP users can
share their
bandwidth with
blocked JAP users
• Requests are
anonymized
through the Mix
network
• Forwarders gain
no information
about contents of
forwarded
requests
Censor-free Internet access
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Censor-free Internet access
JAP
Blocking by government
WWW
Server
MIX MIX MIX
JAP
JAP
...
JAP
JAP
Infor-
mation
Service
JAP
Infor-
mation
Service
...
Provide
forwarder
information
after passing a
Turing test
?
JAP
Infor-
mation
Service
Web request or send e-mail 
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Censor-free Internet access
• InfoService is
sending the IP
number of one
forwarder after
passing a Turing
test
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Misuse
• JAP project
– Avg. 4-5 inquiries per month by law enforcement agencies and
private persons
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Misuse
• JAP project
– Avg. 4-5 inquiries per month by law enforcement agencies and
private persons
– Between 3 and 6 Terabytes per month of anonymized data
• Typical inquiry
– Date and time of access, IP address anonymizing service
– Inquiry: Identification request (name, address) for user behind
that IP address
• Anonymizer is misunderstood as an Internet Service Provider
(ISP)
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Misuse
• Typical crimes committed by use of JAP (suspicion)
– credit card fraud,
– computer fraud,
– sending !malicious code to vulnerable web servers,
– insult,
– defamation,
– death thread,
– access to child pornography
• Observation
– While the traffic anonymized by the system increased over the
time the number of inquiries did not
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Conclusions
• Economical
– There is a market for identity protection.
– Users are willing to pay for it.
• Technical
– Anonymity on the network is necessary as a basic technology for
providing freedom and democracy.
– Prototypes exist at least for Internet/Web
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